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COMMENT: UNITED STATES V. NOSAL II 
Futoshi Dean Takatsuki* 
          The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 
2016) (“Nosal II”) ruled that sharing your Netflix password, for example, is 
a federal crime under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).  In 
Nosal II, the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether obtaining permission 
to use someone’s login credentials constituted an access of “a protected 
computer without authorization” in violation of section 1030(a)(4) of the 
CFAA.  Ultimately, the court broadly interpreted the statute and held that a 
person accesses a computer without authorization, in violation of the 
CFAA, if he or she accesses a computer after the system owner has 
revoked permission to access the computer. 
          The majority in Nosal II broadened violations of the CFAA to 
include, for example, Netflix password sharing along with grievous 
transgressions like stealing trade secrets.  In Nosal II, the majority 
incorrectly focused on defining “without authorization,” rather than getting 
to the heart of the issue, which was who was entitled to give authorization.  
By concluding that the CFAA criminalizes access to computers by those 
without permission conferred by the system owner, the majority steps 
toward the consequences that the Ninth Circuit attempted to prevent in its 
en banc decision in Nosal I: (1) it expands the CFAA to potentially 
criminalize innocuous behavior in password sharing; and (2) it leaves 
citizens who engage in password sharing at the mercy of the system owner 
and local prosecutor.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit in Nosal II should apply 
the rule of lenity to pressure Congress into reforming the CFAA to better 
meet computer use norms of present-day society. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
* I would like to give special thanks to the following people: Professor Jennifer Kamita, 
Valerie Henderson, Tom, Neda, and the entire Loyola Law School Entertainment Law Review 
team.  Without their help and sincere efforts, this Comment would forever be stuck on page one.  
I would also like to thank Mom, Dad, Ojiichan, Obaachan, Uncle Mark, Eiko, Kaori, Atsushi, 
Kazuhiro, Kent, Sarah, Christine, and my friends for their constant encouragement and inspiration 
to stay true to myself and to pursue my dreams.  Thank you very much.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Password sharing has become common “innocuous conduct,” whether 
at work or at home.1  For example, Netflix—the subscription-based Internet 
television network company—specializes in providing streaming media 
online.2  In 2015, over 44.7 million Americans subscribed to Netflix’s 
online multimedia streaming service.3  Of those 44.7 million American 
Netflix subscribers, two-thirds shared their login credentials with at least 
one other person.4  Netflix’s service options seem to promote the practice 
of password sharing, at least within a household: its $7.99 “Basic” plan 
allows for one device to stream content at a time, its $9.99 “Standard” plan 
allows for two devices to stream at the same time, and its $11.99 
“Premium” plan allows for four.5  Moreover, Netflix’s Terms of Use do not 
strictly prohibit password sharing between its users.6  While Netflix does 
not officially encourage password sharing, at the Consumer Electronics 
Show in Las Vegas, Netflix CEO Reed Hastings stated that sharing account 
information was “a positive thing, not a negative thing.”7  Presently, it 
seems that individuals can continue using their parents’, friends’, siblings’, 
                                                     
1. United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016).  
2. See About Netflix, NETFLIX MEDIA CENTER, http://media.netflix.com/en/about-netflix 
[http://perma.cc/E9SJ-ESVY].  
3. Jitender Miglani, Netflix 2015 Revenues, Profits, and Subscribers Growth 
Analysis, REVENUES AND PROFITS (Jan. 20, 2016), http://revenuesandprofits.com/netflix-2015-
revenues-profits-and-subscribers-growth-analysis [http://perma.cc/7QWP-8SHV]. 
4. Jason Mander, Two Thirds of Netflixers Share Their Accounts, GLOBALWEBINDEX 
(July 20, 2015), http://www.globalwebindex.net/blog/two-thirds-of-netflixers-share-their-
accounts [http://perma.cc/X9D2-JH7P]. 
5. See Choose the Plan That’s Right for You, NETFLIX, 
http://www.netflix.com/simple/planform [http://perma.cc/TC7X-Y9EB]. 
6. See Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?local=en&docType=termsofuse [http://perma.cc/5FKX-
CCWZ] (“The Account Owner’s control is exercised through use of the Account Owner’s 
password and therefore to maintain exclusive control, the Account Owner should not reveal the 
password to anyone.”). 
7. Sarah Perez, Netflix CEO Says Account Sharing Is OK, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://techcrunch.com/2016/01/11/netflix-ceo-says-account-sharing-is-ok [http://perma.cc/SMY6-
TZHS]. 
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or acquaintances’ Netflix accounts without fearing any penalty.8  The 
Internet, however, has seen a flurry of disturbing news: sharing your 
Netflix password has apparently been decreed a federal crime under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),9 because of a ruling from the 
Ninth Circuit.10  The case responsible for this alarming news is United 
States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Nosal II”).11  
In Nosal II, the Ninth Circuit was faced with determining whether 
using someone else’s login credentials, with their permission, constituted 
an access of a protected computer “without authorization” in violation of 
section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA.12  Ultimately, the majority concluded that 
the conduct violated section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA, which imposes 
criminal penalties on whoever “‘knowingly and with intent to defraud, 
accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized 
access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and 
obtains anything of value . . . .’”13  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit broadened 
CFAA violations to include innocuous password sharing of, for instance, a 
legitimately owned Netflix account along with grievous transgressions like 
stealing trade secrets.14 
This Comment will explore the history of the CFAA and how the 
Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“Nosal I”), interpreted the vague language of this statute to avoid the 
undesired consequence of criminalizing a broad category of common 
actions that nobody would expect to be federal crimes.15  Next, this 
                                                     
8. See generally Ethan Wolff-Mann, No, the FBI Won’t Drag You Away for Sharing Your 
Netflix Password, MONEY (July 12, 2016), http://time.com/money/4403154/netflix-password-
sharing-federal-crime [http://perma.cc/FKF7-C36K]. 
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012) (effective Sept. 26, 2008). 
10. Wolff-Mann, supra note 8. 
 
11. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028.  
 
12. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)). 
 
13. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)). 
 
14. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1049 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).  
 
15. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860–62 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (refusing 
to interpret the “exceeds authorized access” prong of section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA to extend to 
violations of a company’s use restrictions because doing so would expand the CFAA’s scope far 
beyond computer hacking to criminalize broad day-to-day activity).  
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Comment will critique the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the CFAA in 
Nosal II, which seems to depart from its policy concerns in Nosal I.16  
Finally, this Comment will argue that courts should not attempt to fill the 
gaps of the CFAA, but rather, should apply pressure on Congress to clarify 
the statute’s meaning and scope.   
Part II of this Comment will first explore the history of the CFAA by 
discussing its originally limited purpose and then trace its growth over the 
past two decades to its current posture.  Part III will examine how the Ninth 
Circuit has attempted to limit the scope of the CFAA through its decisions 
in Nosal I and Nosal II.  Part IV will then discuss how the majority’s 
decision in Nosal II will potentially expand CFAA liability to password 
sharing—a common, innocuous behavior.  Part V will consider approaches 
to avoid expanding CFAA liability to common, innocuous behaviors and 
will conclude by proposing the use of the rule of lenity, while courts await 
the reformation of the CFAA, to better meet computer-use norms of 
present-day society.   
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CFAA & ITS CURRENT STATUTORY 
FRAMEWORK 
A. History of the CFAA  
The CFAA traces its origins to the passing of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act (“CCCA”) in 1984.17  Narrow in scope, the CCCA 
established only three federal crimes: hacking into computers to obtain 
national security secrets, hacking into computers to obtain personal 
financial records, and hacking into government computers.18  Thus, the law 
was “‘[c]onsciously narrow in scope and aimed at hackers.’”19  During the 
following two decades, however, Congress substantially expanded the 
CCCA, which began as a criminal statute, into a wide-reaching statute 
                                                     
16. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028–30. 
 
17. See generally Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1976 (1984).  
 
18. Michael C. Mikulic, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 175, 179 (2016); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (effective Sept. 26, 2008).  
 
19. Mikulic, supra note 18, at 179 (alteration in original) (quoting Samantha Jensen, 
Comment, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad Interpretations of the CFAA 
Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 88 (2013)).  
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designed to address new challenges arising in the increasingly 
computerized world.20  
In 1986, Congress passed a series of amendments to the CCCA, 
which resulted in the current statute name—the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act.21  The amendments added three more federal crimes: section 
1030(a)(4) prohibits the unauthorized access of a computer with intent to 
defraud;22 section 1030(a)(5) prohibits accessing a computer without 
authorization and altering, damaging, or destroying information, thereby 
causing either $5,000 or more of aggregated loss or impairing a medical 
diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals;23 and section 
1030(a)(6) prohibits trafficking in computer passwords.24  Then, in 1994, 
Congress expanded the CFAA through the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act,25 which added a civil provision to the CFAA, allowing 
victims of computer crimes to recover civil damages against hackers.26  
Up until the 1994 amendments, violations of the CFAA only 
protected “federal interest” computers “used either by the U.S. Government 
or financial institutions, or as part of a multistate computer network.”27  
The 1996 amendments, however, changed this by expanding the statute to 
cover every computer connected to the Internet.28  Those amendments 
replaced the category of “federal interest” computers with the new category 
of “protected computers,” defined as any machine “used in interstate 
commerce.”29  Then, the category of “protected computer[s]” was further 
                                                     
20. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Vagueness Challenges]. 
 
21. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986); 
Mikulic, supra note 18, at 179. 
 
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).  
 
23. See Id. § 1030(a)(5).  
 
24. See Id. § 1030(a)(6). 
 
25. See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
 
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). 
 
27. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 20, at 1565. 
 
28. Mikulic, supra note 18, at 180. 
 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). 
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expanded to include international computers when Congress passed the 
USA Patriot Act of 2001.30  Thus, by replacing the category of “federal 
interest” computers with “protected computer,” Congress considerably 
expanded the scope of the CFAA.  
The 2008 amendments continued the trend of expanding the realm of 
the CFAA.31  First, the new amendments removed section 1030(a)(2)’s 
interstate communication requirement, which now makes “any 
unauthorized access to any protected computer that retrieves any 
information of any kind, interstate or intrastate . . . punishable by the 
statute” under section 1030(a)(2)(C).32  Thus, a computer no longer needs 
to be connected to the Internet to be within the grasp of the CFAA.33   
B. The CFAA Today  
As a result of the various amendments and our increasing dependency 
on an Internet-connected world, “the CFAA [has become] one of the most 
far-reaching criminal laws in the United States Code.”34  Despite its 
broadened scope, the CFAA’s objective has remained the same since its 
birth in 1984—to prohibit the unauthorized access to a computer.35  Section 
1030(a)(2) prohibits the intentional accessing of a computer without 
authorization or exceeding authorization to obtain financial information, 
information from any department or agency of the United States, or 
“information from any protected computer. . . .”36  Section 1030(a)(4) is the 
federal computer fraud provision, which prohibits accessing a computer 
without authorization or exceeding authorization to defraud and obtain 
anything of value.37  
                                                     
30. Id.; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001). 
 
31. See Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 20, at 1569. 
 
32. Id. 
 
33. Mikulic, supra note 18, at 181. 
 
34. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 20, at 1561. 
 
35. See id. 
 
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
 
37. See Id. § 1030(a)(4). 
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“Most claims brought under the [CFAA] are for unauthorized access 
to a computer or for access beyond the user’s authorization level.”38  
Seventy-three percent of private CFAA claims arise in business disputes, 
and of those, fifty-two percent flow from previous employment.39  
Moreover, approximately fifty percent of civil CFAA filings involve a 
dispute where the plaintiff and defendant had an employee, consultant, or 
contractor relationship.40  Thirty percent of civil CFAA filings were 
brought against a plaintiff’s competitors.41 
C. The Current Circuit Split  
The CFAA seeks to punish those who access a computer without 
authorization or, although authorized, exceed their authorization.42  For 
example, section 1030(a)(2) prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a computer 
without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby 
obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected computer. . . .”43  Similarly, 
section 1030(a)(4) prohibits “knowingly and with intent to defraud, 
access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, or exceed[ing] 
authorized access, and by means of such conduct further[ing] the intended 
fraud and obtain[ing] anything of value. . . .”44  Regardless of whether 
sections 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(4) are brought as a civil or criminal 
charge, the outcome turns on whether a defendant accesses a computer 
“without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access.”45  Despite the 
numerous amendments made to the CFAA, however, the statute fails to 
define the term “without authorization.”46  In contrast, the statute does 
define the phrase “exceeds authorized access”: “to access a computer with 
                                                     
38. Ryan E. Dosh, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: As Conflict Rages on, 
the United States v. Nosal Ruling Provides Employers Clear Guidance, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
901, 904 (2014). 
 
39. Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1481 (2016). 
 
40. Id. at 1480. 
 
41. Id. 
 
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
 
43. Id. (emphasis added).  
 
44. Id. § 1030(a)(4) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Dosh, supra note 38, at 904.  
 
45. See Id. § 1030(a)(2), (4).  
 
46. See Id. § 1030.  
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authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the 
computer that the accesser [sic] is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”47   
The statute’s broad reach, in conjunction with its failure to define 
“authorization,” has created a widening split between circuit courts as to 
the scope and meaning of the CFAA, particularly over the interpretation of 
the CFAA’s terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access.”48  We can divide the approaches that courts have taken into three 
categories: a broad contract-based approach, an even broader agency-based 
approach, and a narrow approach.49   
1. Broad Interpretation: Contract-Based Approach 
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits take a broad approach, based in 
contract law, in interpreting “authorization.”50  Under this contract-based 
approach, courts “look[] beyond how the computer is accessed, and instead 
look[] to the purpose for which it was accessed.”51  If the user accesses a 
computer for a reason “different from, or in excess of, the purpose for 
which permission was granted,” that user will be considered to be without 
authorization or to have exceeded authorized access.52  Courts using this 
contract-based approach will look to whether the user’s conduct was 
governed by an express or implied contract between the user and the party 
with the authority to grant access.53  For courts that utilize this approach, an 
employment contract can establish the parameters of authorized access.54  
                                                     
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).  
 
48. See Dosh, supra note 38, at 906; see also Mikulic, supra note 18, at 184–88; see also 
Circuit Splits, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 250, 265 (2016).  
 
49. Matthew Gordon, Note, A Hybrid Approach to Analyzing Authorization in the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 357, 362 (2015).  
 
50. See Dosh, supra note 38, at 907–09.  
 
51. Gordon, supra note 49, at 366.   
 
52. Id.; see also United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010).   
 
53. Gordon, supra note 49, at 366.  
 
54. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581–83 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(holding that an employee “exceeded authorized access” by attempting to “mine” his former 
employer’s website in violation of a broad confidentiality agreement he signed as part of his 
employment).   
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Under this approach, courts may also recognize the existence of implied 
contracts in the form of widely known company policies.55  
2. Broader Interpretation: Agency-Based Approach  
The Seventh Circuit adopted the broadest approach in interpreting 
“authorization” by applying the CFAA to misuse.56  “Under [this] ‘agency-
based’ approach, employees are ‘authorized’ to use a computer in the 
interest of their employer, however this authorization ends when the 
employee uses the computer or information stored on it to serve an interest 
adverse to the employer’s.”57  This approach extends the CFAA’s reach the 
furthest because, in defining “authorization,” it looks “more generally at 
the interest of the party authorizing the computer’s use” rather than explicit 
or implicit grants of authority as recognized under the contract-based 
approach.58   
3. Narrow Interpretation 
In contrast to the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a narrow approach in interpreting 
the meaning of “authorization” as used in the CFAA.59  Under this 
approach, courts have placed greater emphasis on the purpose of the 
CFAA, recognizing the importance of narrowly construing the statute to 
prevent the CFAA from transforming into an expansive misappropriation 
statute rather than an anti-hacking statute as originally intended.60  
                                                     
55. Gordon, supra note 49, at 366–67; see also John, 597 F.3d at 269–72 (holding that a 
manager’s access of Citigroup’s confidential information to assist in the perpetration of fraud was 
a violation of Citigroup’s official policy, and thus was a violation of the CFAA). 
 
 
56. See Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that an employee was no longer “authorized” to use a company’s computer once the 
employee used the company computer to engage in improper conduct).  
 
57. Gordon, supra note 49, at 368; see also Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21. 
 
58. Gordon, supra note 49, at 369. 
 
59. See Dosh, supra note 38, at 909–10; see also David J. Schmitt, The Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act Should Not Apply to the Misuse of Information Accessed with Permission, 47 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 439 (2014).   
 
60. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
CFAA’s provision of “exceeds authorized access” is limited to violations on “access” to 
information, and not restrictions on its “use”); see also WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. 
Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012) (defining the terms “without authorization” and 
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Consistent with the approach, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have defined 
the word “authorization” as permission or power granted by an authority, 
and thus do not consider the terms of any employment contracts or 
policies.61  Instead, the analysis under the narrow interpretation approach of 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits turns on whether the defendant had 
permission to access the computer from one who had the authority to grant 
such permission.62  
III. UNITED STATES V. NOSAL  
The Ninth Circuit faced the task of interpreting the terms “exceeds 
authorized access” in Nosal I63 and then “without authorization” in Nosal 
II.64  In Nosal I, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the question of whether 
current employees “exceeded authorized access” when they used their 
passwords to download information and source lists for a developing 
competitor.65  The court chose to adopt a narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA’s phrase “exceeds authorized access,” limiting the provision’s 
application to the unauthorized access of a computer, and not to the misuse 
or misappropriation of its information.66  Under this approach, a user 
violates the CFAA when the user does not have authority to access the 
computer in the first place—it does not matter how the user uses the 
                                                     
“exceeds authorized access” narrowly to apply only when an individual accesses a computer 
without permission or obtains or alters information on a computer beyond that which he is 
authorized to access, so as not to “transform a statute meant to target hackers into a vehicle for 
imputing liability to workers who access computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard 
a use policy,” especially where there are other remedies for such grievances). 
 
61. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 
2012) (holding “that an employee is authorized to access a computer when his employer approves 
or sanctions his admission to that computer”); LRVC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 
1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (defining the word “authorization” as “permission or power granted 
by an authority” and holding that an employee who was given a company password and used that 
password to access the company’s website to obtain confidential company statistical data was 
“authorized” to access and use the information on the company’s website). 
 
62. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028; Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129, 1333. 
 
63. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 
64. See United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 
65. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
 
66. Id. at 863–64. 
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computer.67  The court thereby eliminated the possibility of employers 
manipulating computer-use agreements and personnel policies turning such 
employee relationships into ones policed by criminal law. 
Then, in Nosal II, the court was faced with the question of whether 
the CFAA’s prohibition extended to a former employee whose computer 
access was rescinded, but who accessed the computer by using a current 
employee’s login credentials with that employee’s permission.68  The court 
concluded that the phrase “‘without authorization’ is an unambiguous, non-
technical term that, given its plain and ordinary meaning, means accessing 
a protected computer without permission.”69  Thus, the court reasoned that 
the definition of “without authorization” “has a simple corollary: once 
authorization to access a computer has been affirmatively revoked, the user 
cannot sidestep the statute by going through the back door and accessing 
the computer through a third party.”70 
A. Facts  
David Nosal was a high-level regional director at Korn/Ferry 
International, a global executive search firm headquartered in Los Angeles 
with offices in San Francisco and Redwood City, California.71  Nosal 
“worked for Korn/Ferry from approximately April 1996 until October 
2004.”72  “Korn/Ferry’s bread and butter was identifying and 
recommending potential candidates for corporate” executives and other 
high-level positions.73  “[A]fter being passed over for a promotion, Nosal 
announced his intention to leave Korn/Ferry.”74  Negotiations ensued and 
Nosal entered into a Separation and General Release Agreement and an 
Independent Contractor Agreement with Korn/Ferry.75  In these 
                                                     
67. See id. 
 
68. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028–29. 
 
69. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028. 
 
70. Id. 
 
71. Id. at 1030; United States v. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 
72. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
 
73. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030; see also Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.  
 
74. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030. 
  
75. Id.; Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
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agreements, Nosal agreed to serve as an independent contractor to 
Korn/Ferry for roughly a year, and he “agreed not to perform executive 
search[es] or related services for any other entity during the term of his 
contract.”76  In return, as Nosal put it, Korn/Ferry gave him “‘a lot of 
money’ to ‘stay out of the market.’”77  During this period, however, Nosal 
secretly launched his own executive search firm with the assistance of three 
other current or former Korn/Ferry employees: Becky Christian 
(“Christian”), Mark Jacobson (“Jacobson”), and Jacqueline Froehlich-
L’Heureaux (“FH”).78   
“Christian . . . was employed by Korn/Ferry from approximately 
September 1999 to January 2005.”79  “In January 2005, Christian left 
Korn/Ferry and, under instructions from Nosal, set up an executive search 
firm—Christian & Associates—from which” Christian retained twenty-
percent of the revenues, while Nosal retained eighty-percent.80  Jacobson 
then followed Christian a few months later and joined Christian & 
Associates.81  While the three began work for clients, FH remained at 
Korn/Ferry.82   
In its early stages, Nosal’s start-up company lacked a key ingredient 
to become competitive in the executive search firm market—Korn/Ferry’s 
“Searcher” database, a proprietary database of executives and companies.83  
Searcher was “an internal database of information on over one million 
executives” that Korn/Ferry collected over several years.84  Such 
information included “contact information, employment history, salaries, 
biographies and resumes. . . .”85  Searcher allowed for Korn/Ferry 
employees to efficiently compile a “source list” or candidate list for client 
                                                     
76. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030; Nosal 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
 
77. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030. 
 
78. Id.; Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
 
79. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
 
80. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030. 
 
81. Id. 
 
82. Id. at 1030-31. 
 
83. Id. at 1030; Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
 
84. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1030. 
  
85. Id. 
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companies looking to fill an open executive position by searching the 
database.86  Needless to say, Searcher was necessary for Christian & 
Associates to remain competitive in their respective market. 
The Searcher database, however, was hosted on Korn/Ferry’s 
password-protected internal computer network.87  “Korn/Ferry issued each 
employee a unique username and password to its computer system.”88  
Without a password, no person could access Searcher.89  “During the fourth 
quarter of 2004, just prior to leaving Korn/Ferry, Christian downloaded 
custom reports from the ‘Searcher’ database containing over 3,000 records.  
She took copies of these reports with her when she left the firm.”90  
After Christian and Jacobson left the company and Nosal became a 
contractor, Korn/Ferry revoked their credentials to “access Korn/Ferry’s 
computer system.”91  Therefore, on three occasions, the three began 
enlisting the help of FH, who remained an employee at Korn/Ferry.92  “In 
April 2005, Nosal instructed Christian to obtain some source lists from 
Searcher to expedite their work for [their start-up company’s] new 
client.”93  Christian then asked FH for her login credentials, “which 
Christian . . . used to log in to Korn/Ferry’s computer system and run 
queries in Searcher.”94  Christian sent the results of those queries to 
Nosal.95  In July 2005, Christian again accessed Searcher from a computer 
in Korn/Ferry’s San Francisco office using FH’s account to download two 
source lists.96  Then, later that month, Jacobson also used FH’s credentials 
to log into the company’s computer network “to download information on 
                                                     
86. Id. 
 
87. Id. 
 
88. Id. at 1031. 
 
89. See Nosal, 844 at 1031. 
 
90. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1055. 
 
91. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031. 
 
92. Id. 
 
93. Id. 
 
94. Id. 
 
95. Id. 
 
96. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031; Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. 
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2,400 executives.  None of these searches related to any open searches that 
fell under Nosal’s independent contractor agreement.”97  In March 2005, 
Korn/Ferry received an e-mail from an unidentified person alerting 
Korn/Ferry “that Nosal was conducting his own business in violation of his 
non-compete agreement.  The company launched an investigation and, in 
July 2005, contacted government authorities.”98  
B. Nosal I  
On June 26, 2008, at a superseding indictment, Nosal was charged 
with twenty criminal counts, including trade secret theft, mail fraud, 
conspiracy, and eight counts under the CFAA (counts two through nine).99  
Counts two and four through seven alleged that, while employed at 
Korn/Ferry, Christian, and FH used their login credentials, downloaded 
proprietary information, and duplicated that information for Nosal’s 
benefit, both without authorization and by exceeding authorized access.100  
On January 12, 2009, Nosal filed a motion to dismiss the CFAA counts, 
arguing that the CFAA only targets hackers, not individuals who access a 
computer with authorization and then misuse the information obtained 
through such access.101  The district court denied Nosal’s motion, holding 
that the CFAA covered the situations alleged in the complaint.102   
Then, “[i]n September 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided LVRC 
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, which interpreted the CFAA’s prohibition on 
accessing computers ‘without authorization’ or ‘exceeding authorized 
access.’”103  In light of Brekka, Nosal filed a motion to reconsider the 
district court’s order refusing to dismiss the CFAA charges.104  Applying 
the reasoning from Brekka, the district court dismissed counts two and four 
                                                     
97. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031. 
 
98. Id. 
 
99. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 13, 2009). 
  
100. Id. at 4. 
 
101. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. 
 
102. Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *7. 
 
103. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (discussing LRVC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 
F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
  
104. Id. 
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through seven.105  The district court reasoned that access to Korn/Ferry’s 
computers in all five of those instances did not violate section 1030(a)(4) 
because the individuals who allegedly accessed the computer were still 
Korn/Ferry employees with permission to access the company’s 
database.106  The government subsequently appealed the dismissals of 
counts two and four through seven.107  Thereafter, a majority of the justices 
on the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc.108 
The Ninth Circuit, reviewing the case de novo, focused on the 
question of whether Nosal’s accomplices had exceeded their 
authorization.109  The court began with an analysis of the statutory 
definition of “exceeds authorized access”—”‘to access a computer with 
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the 
computer that the accesser [sic] is not entitled so to obtain or alter.’”110  The 
court stated that the language could be read in either of two ways: (1) “it 
could refer to someone who’s authorized to access only certain data or files 
on a computer, but accesses unauthorized data or files,” commonly referred 
to as “hacking”; or (2) it could refer to someone who has unrestricted 
access to information on a computer, but is limited in the manner the 
information can be put to use.111  
The government argued that the statutory text could only support 
“exceeds authorized access” as meaning someone who has unrestricted 
physical access to a computer, but limited in the use to which he can put 
the information.”112  The government contended that “entitled” means 
“furnish[ed] with a right” and that “so” means “in that manner,” referring 
to use restrictions.113  In rejecting these arguments, the court observed that 
                                                     
105. United States v. Nosal, No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
6, 2010). 
 
106. Id. 
 
107. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. 
 
108. United States v. Nosal, 661 F.3d 1180, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (mem.) (ordering 
rehearing en banc).  
 
109. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856–57.  
 
110. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2012) (effective Sept. 26, 
2008)). 
 
111. Id. at 856–57. 
 
112. Id. 
 
113. Id. 
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“entitled” could more sensibly be read as a synonym for “authorized,” and 
that Congress could have very well included the word “‘so’ as a connector 
or for emphasis.”114  Under the court’s interpretation, “exceeds authorized 
access” refers to the accessing of information by individuals whose 
computer-access authorization does not cover that information, rather than 
to the information’s use.115  
The court rejected the government’s interpretation on the grounds that 
it “would transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an 
expansive misappropriation statute.”116  Instead, the court agreed with 
Nosal’s narrower interpretation that “exceeds authorization” refers to 
someone who is authorized to access certain files or data on a computer, 
but exceeds the scope of authorization by accessing unauthorized files or 
data.117  The court noted that a narrower interpretation of the CFAA is “a 
more sensible reading of the text and legislative history of the statute 
whose general purpose is to punish hacking—the circumvention of 
technological access barriers—not misappropriation of trade secrets—a 
subject Congress has dealt with elsewhere.”118  “‘[W]ithout authorization’ 
would apply to outside hackers (individuals who have no authorized access 
to the computer at all) and ‘exceeds authorized access’ would apply to 
inside hackers (individuals whose initial access to a computer is authorized 
but who access unauthorized information or files).”119   
For the court, the government’s construction of the statute posed dire 
consequences for a society that is becoming increasingly reliant on 
computers.120  The court emphatically refused to turn violations of use 
restrictions imposed by employers or websites into crimes under the 
CFAA.121  First, it noted that if employers could define “exceeding access” 
through access restrictions in employment contracts, this could criminalize 
                                                     
 
114. Id. at 858. 
 
115. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858. 
 
116. Id. at 857. 
 
117. Id. at 858.  
 
118. Id. at 863. 
 
119. Id. at 858 (emphases in original). 
 
120. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860. 
 
121. See id. at 862–63. 
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innocuous use.122  As an example, the court noted that an employee could 
be prosecuted simply for watching Reason.TV on the employee’s 
computer.123  The court was also concerned that employers might 
increasingly threaten to report employees to the FBI as a pretext to rid 
themselves of certain employees.124  Second, the court recognized that 
computer users often agree to terms of service without reading or 
understanding them.125  Hence, basing criminal liability upon these 
agreements that are “lengthy, opaque, subject to change, and seldom read” 
would “transform whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into 
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved.”126   
The court provided several examples of the dangers that flow from a 
broad definition.127 First, as the court noted, although “Facebook makes it a 
violation of the terms of service to let anyone log into your account, . . . it’s 
very common for people to let close friends and relatives check their e-mail 
or access their online accounts.”128  As another example, the court 
considered the effects of a broader interpretation on dating websites whose 
terms of use prohibit inaccurate or misleading information, stating that, 
“describing yourself as ‘tall, dark and handsome,’ when you’re actually 
short and homely, will earn you a handsome orange jumpsuit.”129  Finally, 
the court recognized the danger of allowing website owners and companies 
to determine who is authorized access through use agreements where they 
may retain the right to change the terms of these use agreement at any time 
and without notice.130  The danger in a broader approach is that it 
essentially allows website owners or companies to make “behavior that 
                                                     
122. Id. at 860. 
 
123. Id.  
 
124. Id.  
 
125. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.  
 
126. Id.  
 
127. See id. at 861–62 
 
128. Id. at 861.  
 
129. Id. at 862.  
 
130. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
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wasn’t criminal yesterday . . . become criminal today without an act of 
Congress, and without any notice whatsoever.”131   
Concerned that a broad interpretation of the CFAA would criminalize 
a broad range of day-to-day activities, the court applied the doctrine of 
lenity, noting the long-standing principle that courts “must construe 
ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly . . . so that Congress will not 
unintentionally turn ordinary citizens into criminals.”132  Based on the 
above, the Nosal I court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that 
the CFAA, construed narrowly, does not cover misappropriation.133 
C. Nosal II 
1. Procedural History  
After the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Nosal I, Nosal seized the 
opportunity and moved to dismiss the three remaining CFAA counts 
(counts three, eight, and nine) that were not addressed on the appeal.134  
Since the hearing on Nosal’s motion to dismiss, however, the government 
secured a second superseding indictment adding additional factual detail to 
counts three and eight.135  Count three now alleged that Christian, after 
terminating her employment with Korn/Ferry, had used FH’s login 
credentials, and, without authorization and by exceeding authorized access, 
downloaded and duplicated proprietary information from Korn/Ferry’s 
computer system.136  Count eight now alleged that on July 12, 2005, an 
unidentified individual had used FH’s login credentials to access 
Korn/Ferry’s computer network and Christian ran queries to download two 
source lists from the Korn/Ferry system.137  Count nine alleged that on or 
about July 29, 2005, “J.F.” used Jacobson’s computer in Korn/Ferry’s 
offices to remotely log into the Korn/Ferry computer network with her 
                                                     
131. Id.  
 
132. Id. at 862–63.  
 
133. Id. at 863–64. 
 
134. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.  
 
135. Id. at 1053, 1055–56. 
 
136. See id. at 1055.  
 
137. Id. at 1056.  
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login credentials.138  She then turned the computer over to Jacobson who 
used Searcher to download information from the database to his 
computer.139  Under each count, Nosal was alleged to have been involved 
as a co-conspirator.140  
Nosal brought forth three arguments to the district court: (1) that the 
remaining claims must be dismissed because they failed to allege that he or 
his co-conspirators “hacked” the Korn/Ferry computer system;141 (2) that 
the CFAA does not cover situations of voluntary password sharing;142 and 
(3) that in count nine, Jacobson did not “access” Korn/Ferry’s computer 
system to give rise to a violation of the CFAA.143  After the district court 
denied Nosal’s motion to dismiss the three remaining CFAA counts, a jury 
convicted Nosal on all counts.144  Nosal appealed.145  
2. Nosal II Majority Opinion  
The issue facing the court in Nosal II was distinguishable from the 
one addressed in Nosal I.146  In Nosal I, “the Ninth Circuit addressed 
whether Nosal’s coworkers, as current employees, exceeded authorized 
access” by using their own login credentials to access Korn/Ferry’s 
computer network.147  The question before the court in Nosal II was 
whether the CFAA’s prohibition extended to former employees whose 
                                                     
138. Id. 
 
139. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. 
 
140. Id. at 1055. 
 
141. Id. at 1060. 
 
142. Id. at 1061–62. 
 
143. Id. at 1062. 
 
144. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031–32. 
 
145. Id. at 1028. 
 
146. See id. at 1029 (comparing the Nosal I court’s addressing of whether current 
Korn/Ferry employees who downloaded proprietary information in violation of Korn/Ferry’s 
confidentiality and computer policies “‘exceed[ed] authorized access’ with intent to defraud 
under the CFAA,” with its (Nosal II’s) addressing of “whether the ‘without authorization’ 
prohibition of the CFAA extends to a former employee whose computer access credentials have 
been rescinded but who, disregarding the revocation, accesses the computer by other means”). 
 
147. See Trade Secret Misappropriation/Employment Litigation, 28 No. 11 BUS. TORTS 
REP. 269, 271 (2016). 
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computer access was rescinded, but who nonetheless accessed the 
company’s computer by using a current employee’s login credentials with 
that employee’s permission.148  Thus, the court had to decide whether Nosal 
and his accomplices’ use of FH’s login credentials to access Korn/Ferry’s 
Searcher database after their login credentials were revoked violated 
section 1030(a)(4).149  
Again, the court in Nosal II faced deciphering the meaning of the first 
prong of section 1030(a)(4) that was at issue in Nosal I: accessing a 
computer “without authorization” “knowingly and with intent to 
defraud.”150  The Ninth Circuit had already defined the term “without 
authorization” in the previous Brekka and Nosal I cases.151  Reviewing 
precedent, the Ninth Circuit concluded: “‘without authorization’ is an 
unambiguous, non-technical term that, given its plain and ordinary 
meaning, means accessing a protected computer without permission.”152  
Employing the ordinary meaning of the word “authorization” found in 
Black’s Law Dictionary as well as the Oxford Dictionary, the court 
reasoned that the plain and ordinary meaning of “‘authorization’ means 
‘permission or power granted by an authority.’”153  Furthermore, the court 
held that this definition from Brekka “has a simple corollary: once 
authorization to access a computer has been affirmatively revoked, the user 
cannot sidestep the statute by going through the back door and accessing 
the computer through a third party. Unequivocal revocation of computer 
access closes both the front door and the back door.”154  
Thus, whether Nosal accessed Searcher “without authorization” in 
violation of section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA turned on whether the 
                                                     
148. Id.  
 
149. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029 (“Put simply, we are asked to decide whether the 
‘without authorization’ prohibition of the CFAA extends to a former employee whose computer 
access credentials have been rescinded but who, disregarding the revocation, accesses the 
computer by other means.”). 
 
150. See id. at 1028.  
 
151. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858; Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135 (holding that “a person uses a 
computer ‘without authorization’” under the CFAA “when the employer has rescinded 
permission to access the computer and the defendant uses the computer anyway”). 
 
152. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028.  
 
153. Id. at 1035 (quoting Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135). 
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authority to grant permission for such access rested with FH or with 
Korn/Ferry.155  For the majority, there was no question that Korn/Ferry was 
the sole entity that had the exclusive authority to grant persons permission 
to access the Searcher database.156  It therefore held that when FH obtained 
permission to use her login credentials to access Korn/Ferry’s computers, it  
did not authorize Nosal and the others to access the company’s computers 
because “while FH might have been wrangled into giving out her 
password, she and the others knew that she had no authority to control 
system access.”157  The majority reasoned that “Korn/Ferry owned and 
controlled access to its computers, including the Searcher database, and it 
retained exclusive discretion to issue or revoke access to the database.”158   
Accordingly, after Nosal and his accomplices’ credentials were 
revoked, they became “outsiders” who were no longer authorized to access 
Korn/Ferry’s computers.159  Yet, Nosal and the others blatantly 
circumvented the revocation by using the login credentials of FH, the 
current employee of Korn/Ferry who was authorized to access the 
company’s database.160  The majority concluded that Nosal and his 
accomplices’ conduct fell squarely within the CFAA’s prohibition on 
access “without authorization” and affirmed his conviction under section 
1030(a)(4).161While Nosal challenged the jury instruction given at the 
conclusion of his trial, arguing that the CFAA only criminalizes access if a 
party circumvents a technological barrier, the majority found no such 
requirement and concluded that the instruction was a fair and accurate 
characterization of the term “without authorization.”162   
 
                                                     
155. See id. at 1030; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
 
156. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1035–36. 
 
157. Id. at 1035 n.7. 
 
158. See id. at 1035–36. 
 
159. Id. at 1036. 
 
160. See id. 
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IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. The Court’s Majority Improperly Concluded that a Person 
Necessarily Accesses a Computer Account “Without 
Authorization” if He Does so Without the Permission of the System 
Owner.  
For the majority, the issue in Nosal II was straightforward: “whether 
the ‘without authorization’ prohibition of the CFAA extends to a former 
employee whose computer access credentials have been rescinded but who, 
disregarding the revocation, accesses the computer by other means.”163  
The CFAA statute fails to define the terms “without authorization.”164  
Nonetheless, per the majority, the Brekka opinion provided a proper 
definition: “‘[A] person uses a computer “without authorization” . . . when 
the employer has rescinded permission to access the computer and the 
defendant uses the computer anyway.’”165  “‘Without authorization’ is an 
unambiguous, non-technical term that, given its plain and ordinary 
meaning, means accessing a protected computer without permission.”166  
In Brekka, the Ninth Circuit defined the word “authorization” as 
“‘permission or power granted by an authority.’”167  Hence, an individual 
exceeds authorization when the individual “is authorized to use a computer 
for certain purposes but goes beyond those limitations.”168  Further, “a 
person who uses a computer ‘without authorization’ has no rights, limited 
or otherwise, to access the computer in question.”169  There, Brekka used 
his password, supplied by his employer, LVRC, to access LVRC’s website 
to obtain confidential company data.170  Brekka then e-mailed the data to 
the e-mail account he shared with his wife and proceeded to use it in his 
                                                     
163. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029. 
 
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012) (effective Sept. 26, 2008).  
 
165. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029 (alteration in original) (quoting LRVC Holdings LLC v. 
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own consulting business.171  The court reasoned that because LVRC 
provided Brekka with the passsword, LRVC authorized Brekka to access 
and use the information on LVRC’s website, supporting the court’s holding 
that he did not violate the CFAA.172  
This Comment does not dispute the plain ordinary meaning that the 
Ninth Circuit attached to “without authorization.”  Rather, it argues that the 
majority in Nosal II failed to adequately clarify who is entitled to give 
authorization in circumstances where a computer system is accessed with 
the permission of a valid account holder.173  After appealing to the 
“ordinary meaning” and multiple dictionaries to corroborate the definition 
of “authorization” supplied by Brekka, the majority concluded that the 
CFAA criminalizes access to computers by those who do not have 
permission from the system owner.174  Thus, the majority concluded that 
Korn/Ferry, as owner and controller of access to its computers, had 
exclusive discretion to issue or revoke access to the Searcher database.175   
The majority in Nosal II is incorrect to conclude that a person 
necessarily accesses a computer account “without authorization” if he or 
she does so without the permission of the system owner.  Although a 
system owner’s policies may prohibit access to third parties through 
password sharing, legitimate account holders commonly “authorize” access 
of their accounts to others by lending their login credentials.176  In 
justifying its refusal to base criminal liability on violations of private 
computer use policies to avoid criminalizing “otherwise innocuous 
behavior,” the Nosal I court pointed to password sharing in violation of 
Facebook’s Terms of Service as an example.177  It is a violation of 
Facebook’s Terms of Service to allow outsiders to use one’s login 
credentials.178  Yet, as the court in Nosal I pointed out, it is “very common 
                                                     
171. Id. at 1129–30. 
 
172. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135.  
 
173. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1052 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  
 
174. See id. at 1035–36. 
 
175. Id. 
 
176. See Orin S. Kerr, Essay, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 
1174, 1179 (2016); see also Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1051 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).  
 
177. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 861 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 
178. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.facebook.com/terms [http://perma.cc/6S9U-CN5V]; see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861.  
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for people to let close friends and relatives check their e-mail or access 
their online accounts.”179   
Password sharing of Netflix accounts provides another example.  In 
2015, over 44.7 million Americans held legitimate Netflix accounts, of 
which two-thirds shared their login credentials with at least one other 
person.180  In both the Facebook and Netflix examples, legitimate account 
holders commonly “authorize” third parties to access their accounts.181  
Those third parties then access computer systems owned by entities that 
grant access to the account holders.182  While both the account holders and 
the third parties may be aware that, if discovered, they may lose access to 
their online accounts or face a monetary penalty, few would imagine that 
they would go to federal prison for doing so.183   
Furthermore, the dictionary definitions and the cases cited by the 
majority do not support the conclusion that “authorization” necessarily 
comes from the system owner.  The majority relied upon the definition of 
“authorization” put forth in Brekka, which defined “authorization” as 
“‘permission or power granted by an authority.’”184  There, the majority 
appealed to the ordinary meaning of the words “without authorization” and 
several dictionaries to corroborate this definition.185  “Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines ‘authorization’ as ‘[o]fficial permission to do 
something; sanction or warrant.’  The Oxford English Dictionary defines it 
as . . . ‘to give official permission for or approval to.’”186   
                                                     
 
179. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861. 
 
180. Jason Mander, Two Thirds of Netflixers Share Their Accounts, GLOBALWEBINDEX 
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To support its contention that “without authorization” deserves a 
dictionary definition, the majority cited to Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuit 
cases that used dictionaries to give meaning to terms.187  In Pulte Homes, 
Inc. v. Laborer’s International Union of North America,188 the Sixth Circuit 
held that it is “[c]ommonly understood . . . [that] a defendant who accesses 
a computer ‘without authorization’ does so without sanction or 
permission.”189  Similarly, in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. 
Miller, the Fourth Circuit held that based on the common meaning of 
“authorization,” an employee “accesses a computer ‘without authorization’ 
when he gains admission to a computer without approval.”190  
The dictionary definitions the majority cited, however, do not support 
the conclusion that the CFAA criminalizes access by those without the 
system owner’s permission.  The text of the CFAA statute does not 
explicitly require persons to obtain the permission of a system holder; it 
may also be properly read to criminalize computer access only by those 
without the permission of “either a legitimate account holder or the system 
owner.”191  While the dictionary defines “authorization” as receiving 
permission from a person with authority,192 none of those definitions 
suggest that such permission cannot come from a valid account holder.  At 
best, as the Second Circuit concluded in United States v. Valle, while citing 
the Random House Dictionary, the “common usage of ‘authorization’ 
suggests that one ‘accesses a computer without authorization’ if he 
accesses a computer without permission to do so at all.”193  
Additionally, the cases the majority cited do nothing to support the 
position that only the computer system owner can give authorization.194  In 
Pulte Homes, Inc. and Miller, access to a computer system by a third party 
                                                     
187. See id. at 1052 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  
 
188. Id. at 1037 (citing Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 
295 (6th Cir. 2011)).   
 
189. Pulte Homes, Inc., 648 F.3d at 304. 
 
190. WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 
191. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1052 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).   
 
192. See, e.g., id. at 1035. 
 
193. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 524 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 
194. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1037. 
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through a legitimate account holder was not at issue.195  The majority also 
cited United States v. Willis as support.196  But Willis is also factually 
distinguishable from Nosal II.  There, the defendant, Willis, was an 
employee at a debt collection agency who was responsible for assigning 
employees usernames and passwords to access a financial services 
website.197  In exchange for methamphetamine, Willis gave his drug dealer 
the login credentials of a co-worker’s account, without that co-worker’s 
permission, which was then used by others to perpetrate a fraud.198  
Therefore, unlike Nosal and his accomplices who accessed Korn/Ferry’s 
system with the permission of a legitimate account holder,199 the defendant 
in Willis aided third parties in perpetrating fraud by using a legitimate 
account holder’s login credentials without that account holder’s 
permission.200   
B. The Majority’s Interpretation Expands Criminal Culpability Under the 
CFAA to Common, Innocuous Behavior. 
Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 primarily to prevent computer 
hacking.201  In Nosal I, the en banc Ninth Circuit took a narrow approach in 
interpreting the CFAA to maintain its focus as a federal anti-hacking 
statute, and nothing further.202  There, the court expressed concern about 
                                                     
195. In Miller, former employees were accused of downloading their employer’s 
proprietary information, on behalf of a competitor company, prior to resigning from their 
employment.  See Miller, 687 F.3d at 202.  Pulte Homes, Inc. was a CFAA suit brought by a 
homebuilder against a labor union and two of its officers, alleging that the defendants 
intentionally attempted to clog the builder’s phone and e-mail systems with an onslaught of phone 
calls and e-mails.  See Pulte Homes, Inc., 648 F.3d at 298–99.  
 
196. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1037 (citing United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1124–27 
(10th Cir. 2007)). 
 
197. Willis, 476 F.3d at 1123. 
 
198. Id. at 1123–24. 
 
199. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1031. 
 
200. Willis, 476 F.3d at 1123–24. 
 
201. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858; see also David J. Schmitt, The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act Should Not Apply to the Misuse of Information Accessed with Permission, 47 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 423, 429 (2014).   
 
202. See Ryan E. Dosh, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: As Conflict 
Rages on, the United States v. Nosal Ruling Provides Employers Clear Guidance, 47 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 901, 909–10 (2014).   
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expanding the statute beyond computer hacking and held that liability for 
accessing a computer without authorization under the CFAA does not turn 
on use restrictions imposed by employers.203  In refusing to adopt the 
contract- and agency-based approaches to interpreting the CFAA, the Ninth 
Circuit criticized the other circuit courts as looking “only at the culpable 
behavior of the defendants before them, and fail[ing] to consider the effect 
on millions of ordinary citizens . . . .”204  The other circuits, “therefore 
failed to apply the long-standing principle that [courts] must construe 
ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly so as to avoid ‘making criminal law 
in Congress’s stead.’”205   
The Nosal II majority attempted to distinguish Nosal I by interpreting 
it as only being applicable to construing the term “exceeds authorized 
access.”206  But the overarching public policy concerns in Nosal I also 
apply in the context of Nosal II.  In Nosal I, the Ninth Circuit was weary of 
transforming “whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into 
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved.”207  For instance, the 
court refused to base CFAA liability upon a system owner’s use 
restrictions, thereby criminalizing activities such as accessing a work 
computer to visit ESPN.com or visiting dailysudoku.com.208  While system 
owners commonly prohibit such activities, violators are seldom 
disciplined.209   
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit also specifically considered the effect of a 
broad interpretation of the CFAA on the innocuous, common behavior of 
password sharing.210  In the face of this policy concern, the majority stated 
that Nosal II was not a case about password sharing.211  The majority 
acknowledged the dangers noted in Nosal I—”that ill-defined terms [might 
                                                     
203. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859–63.  
 
204. Id. at 862. 
 
205. Id. at 862–63 (citation omitted). 
 
206. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029. 
 
207. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860. 
 
208. Id. 
 
209. Id. 
 
210. See id. at 860. 
 
211. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029. 
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criminalize] arguably innocuous conduct, such as password sharing among 
friends and family. . . .”212  It reasoned, however, that the circumstances 
before the court—”former employees whose computer access was 
categorically revoked and who surreptitiously accessed data owned by their 
former employer”—bore little resemblance to common password 
sharing.213  Because the system owner had revoked Nosal and his 
accomplices’ authorization, and they knew that FH had no authority to 
control system access, they acted “without authorization” in violation of the 
CFAA when they used FH’s login credentials to circumvent the revocation 
of access.214  Yet, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Nosal II criminalizes 
those who access the computer system even with the legitimate account 
holder’s login credentials.215  As such, this interpretation undermines the 
invisible line the Ninth Circuit previously created that separates innocuous 
behavior from the criminal computer hacking that the CFAA was intended 
to prevent. 
C. The Majority’s Interpretation of Accessing a Computer “Without 
Authorization” Leaves Criminal Culpability in the Hands of Private 
Companies & the Local Prosecutor. 
Despite the majority’s efforts to avoid the criminalization of 
innocuous behavior by recognizing liability under the CFAA if 
authorization to access a computer is revoked, such an interpretation still 
runs afoul of two other public policy concerns the Ninth Circuit touched 
upon in Nosal I.  First, in Nosal I, the Ninth Circuit warned about the 
dangers of having the public at large live at the mercy of companies and 
local prosecutors.216  In the context of employer-employee relationships 
like Nosal and Korn/Ferry, broadly interpreting the CFAA allows private 
parties to manipulate their computer use and personnel policies so as to 
turn these relationships into ones policed by the criminal law.217  
                                                     
212. Id. at 1038. 
 
213. Id. 
 
214. Id. at 1035–36. 
 
215. See United States v. Nosal, No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 6, 2010). 
 
216. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
 
217. Id. 
 
TOSH_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/24/2017  1:43 PM 
2017] UNITED STATES V. NOSAL II  333 
“Significant notice problems arise if” criminal liability turns on private 
policies that are “lengthy, opaque, subject to change and seldom read.”218  
Not only are such terms vague and unknown, however, system owners also 
typically retain the right to change terms at any time and without notice.219   
For example, Netflix’s Terms of Use states, “Netflix may, from time 
to time, change these Terms of Use, including the Privacy Statement and 
[End User License Agreement].  Such revisions shall be effective 
immediately; provided however, for existing members, such revisions shall, 
unless otherwise stated, be effective 30 days after posting.” 220  Currently, 
Netflix does not prohibit third parties from accessing its content using a 
valid account holder’s login credentials.221  What, then, would occur if 
Netflix decided to change its Terms of Use to prohibit access through 
password sharing?  Would access to Netflix be “revoked” to the millions 
who use their friends’ or family members’ Netflix accounts, and thus 
criminalize their actions overnight?   
Answers to such questions are ambiguous because the majority fails 
to clarify what constitutes a “revocation” of authority that would give rise 
to CFAA liability for accessing a computer “without authorization.”222  On 
the one hand, in the above hypothetical, those who had accessed content on 
Netflix through the use of a valid account holder’s login credentials may 
have had their access “revoked” at the moment Netflix changed its Terms 
of Use.  On the other hand, “revocation” is more obvious if Netflix were to 
personally serve the person who accessed content through the use of a valid 
account holder’s login credentials, for example, via a cease and desist 
letter.  But in determining that Nosal and his accomplices acted without 
authorization when accessing Korn/Ferry’s Searcher database, the majority 
pointed out that “[Korn/Ferry] revoked [Nosal’s] authorization and, while 
                                                     
218. Id. at 860; see also Michael C. Mikulic, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 175, 188–98 (2016). 
 
219. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.  
 
220. Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?local=en&docType=termsofuse [http://perma.cc/5FKX-
CCWZ]. 
 
221. Netflix’s Terms of Use states that an “Account Owner’s control [over his or her 
account] is exercised through use of the Account Owner’s password and therefore to maintain 
exclusive control, the Account Owner should not reveal the password to anyone.”  Id.  While not 
revealing the passwords may be an effective means of maintaining exclusive control, Netflix does 
not specifically prohibit the sharing of that password.  See id.   
 
222. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028. 
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FH might have been wrangled into giving out her password, she and the 
others knew that she had no authority to control system access.”223  Thus, 
based upon the majority’s reasoning, with a simple change in Netflix’s 
Terms of Use and perhaps an automated e-mail to the legitimate account 
holders, the legitimate account holders and third party non-subscribers 
alike may be assumed to know that the account holders have no authority to 
control system access.224  Thus, any subsequent access by non-subscribers 
through password sharing would be accessing Netflix’s computer system 
“without authorization” in violation of the CFAA.  
In Nosal I, the government assured the court that “whatever the scope 
of the CFAA,” the government would not prosecute such minor violations 
as those described above.225  The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, however, 
refused to rely upon such a dangerous proposition, stating: “we shouldn’t 
have to live at the mercy of our local prosecutor.”226  Indeed, the same 
policy concern applies in the context of password sharing.  The act of 
accessing an online account, such as an e-mail account, with the account 
holder’s permission is common in our society and often harmless.227  Yet, 
under the majority’s interpretation, citizens who engage in such mundane 
activities are criminals if the prosecutors and juries determine the specific 
action to be morally reprehensible.  Granting such power to prosecutors 
invites discriminatory and arbitrary law enforcement.228   
                                                     
223. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1035 n.7. 
 
224. In a subsequent case, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062 
(9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant accessed a computer “without 
authorization” when he accessed Facebook accounts with the permission of valid account holders, 
even after receiving a cease and desist letter from Facebook.  There, the court held that the cease 
and desist letter constituted a “revocation” by the system owner, which the defendant 
subsequently attempted to circumvent.  Id. at 1069.  The Nosal II facts, however, do not indicate 
that Nosal or his accomplices received any similar notice.  
 
225. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
 
226. Id. 
 
227. See id. at 861; see also Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1053–54 (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
 
228. To demonstrate how the CFAA can be used as a tool of the prosecutors to charge a 
person’s online behavior as a crime, the Ninth Circuit in Nosal I cited United States v. Drew, 259 
F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009), where a woman was charged under the CFAA for violating 
MySpace’s terms of service, which prohibited lying about identifying information, including age.  
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862. 
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V. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION  
A. The Dissent’s Approach Would Create a Loophole for “Inside” 
Hackers. 
Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s dissent shares the major concerns 
addressed in this Comment.229  For Judge Reinhardt, Nosal II was about 
password sharing—”ubiquitous, useful, and generally harmless conduct” 
that Congress did not intend to criminalize through the CFAA.230  In his 
view, the court’s majority failed to create “a workable line” between 
consensual password sharing of millions of legitimate account holders and 
grievous transgressions like stealing trade secrets.231  
Judge Reinhardt was particularly critical of the majority’s conclusion 
that a person necessarily accesses a computer account “without 
authorization” if he does so without the permission of the system owner.232  
Listing several examples, such as “the case of an office worker asking a 
friend to log onto his e-mail to print a boarding pass, in violation of the 
system owner’s access policy,” Judge Reinhardt argued that access may be 
“authorized” even without permission from the system owner.233  Thus, the 
majority’s construction expands the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute to 
one that criminalizes otherwise innocuous conduct just because a computer 
is involved.  
To avoid this result, Judge Reinhardt proposed an alternative 
construction of “without authorization.”234  “[T]he best reading of ‘without 
authorization’ in the CFAA is a narrow one: a person accesses an account 
‘without authorization’ if he does so without having the permission of 
either the system owner or a legitimate account holder.”235  “This narrower 
reading,” Judge Reinhardt argued, “is more consistent with the purpose of 
the CFAA” because the statute would extend only to “those whom we 
                                                     
229. See United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1048–58 (9th Cir. 2016) (Reinhardt J., 
dissenting). 
 
230. Id. 1048 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).   
 
231. See id. at 1049 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).  
  
232. Id. at 1051 (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
 
233. Id. (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
 
234. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1051 (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
 
235. Id. (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
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would colloquially think of as hackers: individuals who steal or guess 
passwords or otherwise force their way into computers without the consent 
of an authorized user, not persons who are given the right of access by 
those who themselves possess that right.”236   
Although Judge Reinhardt’s proposed construction of the CFAA was 
intended to narrowly target hackers while protecting civilians who engage 
in password sharing,237 his narrow construction of the CFAA undermines 
the statute’s purpose of preventing hackers from accessing protected 
computers.  Construing “without authorization” to mean that a person 
accesses a computer account without permission from either the system 
owner or a legitimate account holder fails to consider the possibility of a 
hacker obtaining access to a computer with the permission of a valid 
account holder, and then proceeding to destroy an entire computer system 
from the inside out.238  For instance, under Judge Reinhardt’s proposed 
construction, a person would be criminally culpable for accessing a 
computer with the intent to destroy the entire network only if he or she 
does so with no permission at all.  That same person, however, would not 
be criminally culpable if he had permission from an account holder to do 
so.  The CFAA cannot adequately fulfill its anti-hacking purpose if such a 
loophole exists.  
B. A Code-Based Approach Would Protect Against Criminalizing 
Password Sharing, But Would Undermine the Purpose of the CFAA. 
Another proposed solution before the court in Nosal II was the “code-
based” approach.239  In its amicus brief in support of Nosal, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (“EFF”)240 argued that CFAA liability requires the 
circumvention of a technological barrier.241  Similar to Judge Reinhardt’s 
                                                     
236. Id. (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
 
237. See id. (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
 
238. Id. at 1037. 
 
239. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant-
Appellant at 11, United States v. Nosal, Nos. 14-10037 & 14-10275 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2014) 
(arguing that “circumvention of a technological access barrier is necessary for the purposes of the 
CFAA”). 
 
240. Id. at 1 (“The Electronic Frontier Foundation (‘EFF’) is a non-profit, member-
supported civil liberties organization working to protect digital rights.”).  
 
241. Id. at 11. 
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approach, EFF viewed Brekka and Nosal I as narrowing the interpretation 
of the CFAA to maintain its focus as a federal anti-hacking statute.242  In its 
view, the Brekka decision to have “authorization” turn on an employer’s 
explicit actions to grant or deny permission to use a computer was “simply 
another way of stating that circumvention of a technological access barrier 
is necessary” for CFAA liability.243  
Under this “code-based” approach, a system owner indicates who is 
permitted and not permitted to access a computer system when the system 
owner erects a technological access barrier, such as a password 
requirement, to allow authorized persons in and keep unwanted persons 
out.244  Thus, using an authorized user’s login credentials, with the user’s 
permission, is not circumventing a technological barrier because the third 
party acts as the authorized user’s agent or proxy.245   
This code-based construction of “without authorization,” however, 
creates certain inconsistencies within the CFAA.  First, as the Nosal II 
majority explained, a requirement that a party must circumvent a 
technological access barrier “make[s] little sense because some [section] 
1030 offenses do not require access to a computer at all.”246  Second, 
similar to Judge Reinhardt’s proposed construction in his dissent,247 a code-
based approach is too restrictive, and thus fails to protect against conduct 
that Congress intended the CFAA to prevent.  As one scholar explained, a 
person commits a crime under section 1030(a)(5)(A) if the person 
“‘knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or 
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage 
without authorization, to a protected computer.’”248  Under a code-based 
approach, therefore, a person would not be criminally culpable for 
intentionally destroying an entire computer system so long as that person 
                                                     
242. Id. at 7–8. 
 
243. Id. at 11. 
 
244. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 239, at 11; see also Matthew Gordon, Note, A 
Hybrid Approach to Analyzing Authorization in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 21 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 357, 362 (2015). 
 
245. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 239, at 13. 
 
246. Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1039. 
 
247. Id. at 1051 (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
 
248. Gordon, supra note 244, at 365 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012) (effective 
Sept. 26, 2008)). 
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did not circumvent a technological access barrier.249  Although a code-
based approach protects against the unintended consequence of 
criminalizing innocuous password sharing, it also undermines the CFAA’s 
ability to prevent at least one form of hacking for which it was created to 
protect.   
C. An Agency Approach Broadens the CFAA to Criminalize Password 
Sharing  
Finally, at least one scholar has suggested that “authorization” in the 
digital world rests on trespass norms in the physical world.250  When a 
physical lock and key limits access, whether entry into premises is physical 
trespass depends upon whether it falls within the zone of permission 
granted by the owner.251  Similar to how a landlord may grant access to the 
landlord’s land to a third party, a computer owner may grant access rights 
to a valid account holder.  It would follow that under trespass norms, the 
account holder is authorized to access the account while others are not.252   
When the account holder gives his or her login credentials to a third 
party, however, access by that third party is authorized only if the third 
party continues to act as the account holder’s agent.253  Under such a 
construction of the CFAA, if the third party accesses the account on the 
account holder’s behalf, the third party acts in the place of the account 
holder and accesses the computer “with authorization.”254  If the third party 
uses the valid account holder’s login credentials in pursuit of the third 
party’s own ends, however, then the third party accesses the computer 
without authorization.255   
                                                     
249. Id. at 365; see also Trademotion, LLC v. Marketcliq, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 
1291 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff’s former employee did not violate the CFAA 
when he intentionally deleted files from the company’s computers and inserted code into its 
software to divert e-mails from prospective customers to his current employer because he did not 
circumvent a technological barrier).  
 
250. See Orin S. Kerr, Essay, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 
1146 (2016).   
 
251. Id. at 1153.   
 
252. Id. at 1178. 
 
253. Id. 
 
254. Id. at 1178–79.   
 
255. Kerr, supra note 250, at 1179. 
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An agency approach such as that described above broadens the CFAA 
to criminalize innocuous conduct such as shopping for personal items 
online, checking the news, or accessing an e-mail account.256  For example, 
assume that a law student gives a colleague his school login credentials 
specifically to print certain criminal law outlines he has saved on his cloud 
account within the school’s system.  A strict adherence to the proposed 
agency approach might criminalize that colleague’s conduct if that 
colleague chooses to check the weather or inadvertently accesses the wrong 
documents.   
The problem escalates further when the “zone of permission” granted 
by the owner is unclear.  In the context of employer-employee 
relationships, where the CFAA is most commonly raised, scholars have 
criticized the agency-based approach for failing to define “authorization” in 
a way that gives employees notice of prohibited computer activities.257  
Because “authorization” under an agency approach is a subjective inquiry, 
employees are left with no reliable or predictable way to determine if they 
have authorization to access a computer.  The result is that liability will 
turn on when authorization terminated in the eyes of the principal, leading 
to inconsistent applications of the CFAA.  As one scholar argued, “what 
one employer may tolerate—occasional non-business-related web 
browsing—another might find an outrageous and blatant misuse of 
company time and resources.”258   
D. Congress Must Reform the CFAA and Define the Terms “Without 
Authorization” 
A construction of the CFAA’s “without authorization” must be 
narrow enough to prevent the criminalization of innocuous, commonly 
utilized conduct such as password sharing.  Such a construction must also 
be broad enough to allow the CFAA to prevent all forms of hacking as it 
was intended, which it cannot do in its current form.  Courts, however, 
should not attempt to construct such meanings from scratch because it has 
led to inconsistent results among different jurisdictions.259  
                                                     
256. See Samantha Jensen, Comment, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why 
Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 116 (2013). 
 
257. Michael C. Mikulic, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 175, 184–89, 194 (2016).  
 
258. Jensen, supra note 256, at 116–17.   
 
259. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (explaining that “because 
criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures 
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Instead, the CFAA should be resolved in favor of the criminal 
defendant because its text is ambiguous.260  The statute fails to define the 
terms “without authorization,” and courts continue to struggle to provide a 
definition of their own.261  Members of the public are therefore left to guess 
at the phrases’ meanings and speculate as to whether their conduct violates 
the CFAA.  Indeed, at least one scholar criticized the CFAA as being 
unconstitutional because it fails to adequately provide notice to the 
common person about whether that person’s conduct is criminal.262   
Thus, courts should not feel responsible for defining the scope of the 
CFAA.  Rather, Congress must clarify the terms and scope of the statute 
and update the CFAA to meet the needs of an increasingly Internet-reliant 
society.263  In the meantime, courts should apply the rule of lenity, which 
requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of 
defendants.264  The Ninth Circuit has already applied the rule of lenity in 
                                                     
and not courts should define criminal activity.”); see also Mikulic, supra note 257, at 194–96 
(explaining that because the CFAA is vague, it fails to provide “fair notice of what is prohibited 
under the statute”). 
 
260. Jensen, supra note 256, at 123; see also LRVC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 
1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the rule of lenity because “[t]he Supreme Court has long 
warned against interpreting criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected 
burdens on defendants”).  
 
261. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 
2012) (declining to extend CFAA liability to violations of use-restrictions). 
 
262. See Mikulic, supra note 257, at 189 (citing Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 
451, 453 (1939), for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment’s “Due Process Clause requires 
that persons ‘be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.’”); see also United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“A conviction fails to comport with due process if the 
statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of 
what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory 
enforcement.”).  Therefore, because the CFAA does not define the meaning of “without 
authorization,” it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what behavior is 
culpable.  This problem is highlighted by the different ways circuit courts have defined the 
CFAA’s key terms.  
 
263. See Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1050–51 (Reinhardt J. dissenting). 
 
264. United States v. Santos, 533 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); see also Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134 
(applying the rule of lenity because, “[t]he Supreme Court has long warned against interpreting 
criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on defendants”); 
Bass, 404 U.S. at 347–48 (holding that “‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes 
should be resolved in favor of lenity’” because “criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community,” and so, “legislatures and not courts should define criminal 
activity”); Jensen, supra note 256, at 98–99 (“The rule of lenity embodies two important policies.  
First, citizens should be given fair warning in easily understood language of behavior that can 
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Nosal I when it refused to adopt the stricter construction of “exceeds 
authorization.”265  It should have done the same in Nosal II, by refusing to 
read “without authorization” broadly until Congress provides a clear 
definition of those terms and the Supreme Court finds the statute 
constitutional.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress created the CFAA to criminalize computer hacking and the 
improper access of computer systems.266 The ambiguous statutory text of 
the CFAA, however, has led to inconsistent constructions of its meaning 
and scope.267  As a product of the 1980s, when computer systems were 
relatively rare and single-purposed, the CFAA has not kept up with a 
society where millions of users use computer systems for everyday 
activities. 
In Nosal II, the Ninth Circuit attempted to apply the CFAA to conduct 
that perhaps Congress did not foresee as becoming common practice 
among family and friends and certainly did not intend to criminalize.  Yet, 
by broadly interpreting the words “without authorization,” the Ninth 
Circuit has placed those who access a friend or family member’s Netflix, 
Facebook, or e-mail accounts, even with that account holder’s permission, 
at the mercy of the system owners and the local prosecutor.  Nevertheless, 
at least in the meantime, Netflix users should fear not; Netflix has not 
prohibited access to their system by those who engage in password 
sharing.268  Yet, with a simple change in their Terms of Use and a 
revocation of access, Netflix may render over twenty-nine million 
Americans criminals overnight. 
 
                                                     
result in criminal sanctions.”  “Second, laws with criminal penalties are a reflection of society’s 
condemnation and should be defined by legislatures, not courts.”). 
 
265. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 
266. Michael C. Mikulic, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 175, 179 (2016).   
 
267. Ryan E. Dosh, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: As Conflict Rages 
on, the United States v. Nosal Ruling Provides Employers Clear Guidance, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
901, 907–10 (2014). 
 
268. See Netflix Terms of Use, NETFLIX (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?local=en&docType=termsofuse [http://perma.cc/5FKX-
CCWZ]. 
 
